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Abstract
It is not clear to what the projects of creating an artificial in-
telligence (AI) that does ethics, is moral,  or makes moral
judgments amounts. In  this paper we discuss some of the
extant metaethical theories and debates in moral philosophy
by which such projects should be informed, specifically fo-
cusing on the project of creating an AI that makes moral
judgments. We argue that the scope and aims of that project
depend  a  great  deal  on  antecedent  metaethical  commit-
ments. Metaethics, therefore, plays the role of an Archime-
dean fulcrum in this context, very much like the Archime-
dean role that it is often taken to take in context of norma-
tive ethics (Dworkin 1996; Dreier 2002; Fantl 2006; Ehren-
berg 2008). 
Realism and antirealism  
One of the  divisions in metaethics is between realism and
antirealism. Realist views claim that the universe features
objective  and  mind-independent  moral  properties.  Moral
theories aim to “get it right” with respect to these proper-
ties in a way similar to how science aims to “get it right”
about  the  properties  of  relevance  in  its  respective  disci-
plines. Moral realism is the view that moral judgments ei-
ther succeed or fail in corresponding to a mind independent
moral reality. Antirealist views reject realism and typically
also preclude moral theories that aim to “get it right” about
moral  properties.  Antirealists  typically  deny  that  moral
properties or facts are objective or mind independent in the
same way the realist takes them to be.
It  is  important  to  note that  this  binary division by no
means exhausts the possible metaethical positions. Views
like Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism, Simon
Blackburn’s  quasi-realism,  and  Alan  Gibbard’s  norm-ex-
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pressivism provide alternatives to the strict realist/anti-real-
ist  divide  (Korsgaard  1996;  Blackburn  1993;  Gibbard
1990). These diverse views, as well as others, aim to cap-
ture  the  realist  and  objectivist  phenomenology of  moral
language and thought, while making minimal ontological
commitments. However, for the purposes of this paper we
will focus on a simplified division between realism and an-
tirealist positions. 
Our expectations for engineering an AI that does ethics
in any sense must, at least to some extent, be conditional
upon one of these views. Realists can aim at the ambitious
goal of engineering a machine that has the potential to de-
tect moral properties or give new insight into moral facts.
A realist  can also entertain the hope that  a machine can
help  bridge  the  troublesome  epistemic  gap  between  our
limited cognitive faculties, the biases we are vulnerable to,
our incomplete understanding of causal relations etc., and
the moral facts that exist independently of what we happen
to believe or think of them. Of course, just the possibility
of such a machine leaves open a multitude of other onto-
logical questions about what it is we are attempting to de-
tect:  the properties  of  events,  things,  persons or  perhaps
something altogether different.
Using a simplifying analogy, we can think about an AI
capable  of  making  moral  judgments  by detecting  moral
properties themselves as akin to a microscope. The micro-
scope allows us to observe the existence and behavior of
microscopic organisms and better understand the relations
between their presence and a disease or to confirm or dis-
confirm various hypotheses about infection. With the help
of a moral microscope in the guise of an AI, in a similar
way our hypotheses about what is right and wrong could be
confirmed or disconfirmed.
A fuller discussion of the possibilities of such a device
would involve not only a defense of the metaethical onto-
logical assumptions about the existence of moral proper-
ties, but also of assumptions about how we acquire moral
knowledge.  All  this  should  ideally  be  settled  before  we
would start speculating about what kind of tool would be
able to detect moral properties or be useful in improving on
our ability to acquire moral knowledge;a lot of philosophi-
cal  work  would  have  to  get  done first.  But  assume this
work is done or we simply take a realist metaethical posi-
tion  for  granted.  At  that  point  we  still  have  to  decide
whether the moral microscope AI is going to be a machine
that  helps  us  to  settle  first  order  normative  questions or
whether it advises us on the permissibility of a particular
action. Alternatively, perhaps its role is to help us adjudi-
cate between competing normative theories,such as Kan-
tianism or utilitarianism, and provide us with the founda-
tional elements of right and wrong.
Speculation  about  such  devices  invites  criticism from
several angles. First, the task of creating models of these
devices and then implementing them is daunting. Second,
we  face the additional problem of verification of whether
the machine is working at all.
Whatever result  the moral  microscope AI produces,  it
would presumably be in the form of an answer to some
first order moral question, such as “should X do Y now?”
The problem is that verifying whether the machine is giv-
ing us a morally acceptable answer can only be made in
light of our assessment of its consistency with other values,
principles, and cases, or how well it fares when put through
a process of wide reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1975). This
raises  the  philosophical  question  of  whether  we  should
have more confidence in the judgments of the AI than we
have in our own well considered deliberative conclusions
regarding difficult moral questions.
None of this implies that the idea of a moral microscope
AI is a non-starter. We can envision several ways in which
an AI that issues moral judgments could be useful, given
background  realist metaethical assumptions. If we assume,
for example, that moral properties are causally efficacious
(as prominent versions of naturalistic realism do), perhaps
the machine could detect the effects of moral properties to
which  we  are  not  sufficiently  sensitive  (Sturgeon  1985,
1986). Or the moral judgments that the AI issues could be
free  of  cognitive  distortions  such  as  scope  insensitivity,
which is the phenomenon of our feelings of empathy and
willingness to aid each individual decreasing with the in-
crease in numbers of individuals (Persson and Savulescu
2012, p. 30).
For an antirealist the idea that a machine could play the
role of a microscope is completely misguided.  Moral facts
or properties are not out there in the world to be found.
They are instead features of our beliefs, emotive reactions,
or  attitudes towards what  is  otherwise  a  morally neutral
world.  In Hume's words we gild or stain the world with
morality through the projection of our sentiments (Hume
1975/1751 p. 294). The antirealist can only expect an AI to
do whatever we do when we form moral judgments. For
example, moral error theory, a type of antirealism, claims
that  although  our  moral  judgments  and  moral  language
have the form assertions or propositions.  This means that
moral judgments are consistently false when they are used
in ways to make claims about particular things being right
or  wrong,  virtuous  or  vicious,  etc  (Mackie  1977;  Joyce
2001). An AI created with this metaethical stance inform-
ing it  would be radically different  from the  one  created
with a realist theory in mind. 
In contrast to the analogy of the microscope, an AI that
forms moral judgments in a way that simulates what we do
when  we  form moral  judgments  (replicating  our  limita-
tions, flaws, etc.) could be likened to weather forecasting
model. Given certain inputs the model would make predic-
tions about the likely outputs. It could presumably also en-
gage  in  the  expression  of  attitudes  (some  bad  weather
ahead),  imperatives  (do  not  go outside!)  or  prescriptives
(use caution while driving).
The simulation approach is compatible with all metaeth-
ical positions, not just antirealism. This is because the goal
of making such a device is to replicate some features of hu-
man psychology, irrespective of whether this psychology is
responsible  for  tracking  actual  moral  properties  in  the
world  or  just  projecting  them.  Consequently,  the  set  of
metaethical questions that are most relevant to this project
are those that have to do with the kind of mental state that
a moral judgment is and what kinds of capacities for moti-
vation, emotion, etc. are required to be able to  form that
mental state.
Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, internalism and
externalism
The project of simulating moral  judgments in an AI can
have strong and weak ambitions. The strong project will
take for granted that the project of so-called strong artifi-
cial intelligence is viable, meaning, that we can create hu-
man level mental states, such as beliefs and desires, in a
machine.  The  weaker  project  would  aim  at  replicating
some subset of abilities or capacities, without the presump-
tion that these are actually mental states in any sense. Both
of these strategies have to address the same basic metaethi-
cal questions.
The most important  question is  about  the ontology of
moral  judgments  themselves.  An answer  to  it  conditions
what it would take to implement human level moral judge-
ments in a machine. One part of the ontological problem of
moral judgments is that it is highly controversial what peo-
ple do, exactly, when they make them. Metaethicists dis-
agree whether moral judgments are beliefs, desires, expres-
sions of emotions, or some combinations of these. The sec-
ond part of the ontological problem is that we need to at
least provisionally settle on the relationship between moral
judgments and moral motivation. So, before we begin engi-
neering or modeling human moral judgments, a host of po-
sitions in metaethics needs to be either settled or assumed.
One critical distinction in the ontology of moral judg-
ments is  between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. As a
view about moral psychology, cognitivism is the position
that  moral  judgments  are  primarily  beliefs  and  thus  not
conative states, such as pro-attitudes or desires. As a view
about language, cognitivism is the position that moral lan-
guage is truth apt, meaning, that moral sentences express
propositions that can be evaluated as true or false or that
moral terms refer to moral properties.
Non-cognitivism is the view that  moral  judgments are
conative states, such as desires, emotions, or pro-attitudes,
and not beliefs. As a view about language, non-cognitivism
typically implies that moral language is not truth apt, that
is,  moral  language does  not  assert  that  something is  the
case.
There  have  recently been  a  number  of  arguments  for
views that  reject   the cognitive-non-cognitive dichotomy
altogether. In place of that dichotomy some theorists offer
hybrid views, which characterize moral judgments as men-
tal states that have features of both beliefs and desires or
views that  characterize moral judgments as consisting of
more than one type of mental state. For example, the “be-
sire” theory, which posits the existence of one mental state.
On this view, moral judgments have characteristics of a be-
lief in that they purport to represent some state of affairs
and the  motivational  component  of  desires  in  that  the
moral judgment itself is sufficient to move one to act on it
(Altham 1986; Bedke 2009).  Other hybrid views include
non-descriptivist cognitivism (Horgan and Timmons 2000)
and there are others (Ridge 2006). 
These views each have their advantages and disadvan-
tages. Cognitivism, for example, is thought to better cap-
ture some important  surface features of moral  discourse,
such as its appearing to be descriptive. Another purported
advantage of cognitivism is that it is consistent with moral
language  that  suggests  objectivity  in  cases  when  people
hold conflicting moral judgments on a particular topic and
assume that they cannot all be correct. Furthermore, people
seem to recognize the possibility that they can be mistaken
in their own moral judgments and that they can alter them
in light of evidence—an assumption that fits best with the
view that moral language is truth apt. Finally, cognitivism
has the advantage of providing a straightforward picture of
moral propositions. On this view, moral propositions have
the same meaning whether they are in asserted or unassert-
ed context (the Frege-Geach problem) (Geach 1964).
For non-cognitivists moral assertions such as ‘Stealing is
wrong’ are  understood  as  expressions  of  non-cognitive
states like the speaker’s negative attitude toward stealing.
If non-cognitivism is correct, then it is hard to understand
how moral terms can function as antecedents of condition-
als,  such as  “if  stealing is wrong,  then stealing bread is
wrong” or when they are used in valid arguments. In valid
moral arguments, the moral terms are assumed to mean the
same thing in all of the premises. But if they are merely ex-
pressions of  attitudes  or  other  non-cognitive  states,  then
prima facia they do not mean the same thing in all con-
texts.
Non-cognitivism, on the other hand, has the advantage
of explaining persistent moral disagreement that seemingly
cannot be settled even when people agree on all of the rele-
vant  nonmoral  facts.  Non-cognitivists  can  argue  that  in
such situations people who disagree are merely expressing
two distinct affective states which need not be responsive
to argument or evidence. Non-cognitivism also seems to be
able to better explain the close relationship that appears to
exist between making a moral judgment and acting on that
moral judgment. Emotions, attitudes, desires, and prescrip-
tions motivate us to act, propositions like beliefs do not.
Hybrid views face the criticism that it is impossible for
one mental state to have both a world to mind and a mind
to world direction of fit. which would Such a mental state
would have to be a state that is both responsive to evidence
and not responsive to evidence (Smith 1994 p. 118). How-
ever, hybrid views have the advantage of capturing some of
the unique properties that moral judgments have, especially
their motivational force, the authority that they claim in our
mental lives and decision making, as well as their aiming
to represent some state of affairs all at once.  The AI engi-
neer  that  aims to  create a  simulation machine for  moral
judgments will have to navigate this technical debate and
choose sides.
Things get even more complicated.  The most technical
aspect of the philosophical debate about the psychological
nature of  moral  judgments concerns the relationship that
moral judgments have to action and motivation. The dis-
cussion often begins with the observation that it is odd for
someone  to  judge  that  something  is  morally  wrong  and
subsequently  claim  that  this  gives  them  no  motivation
whatsoever  to  refrain  from  doing  it.  Hence,  one  of  the
unique features of moral judgments, as compared to other
types of judgments, is assumed to be its special connection
to motivation. 
Many philosophers argue that to make a moral judgment
is necessarily to have a (defeasible) motivation to act on it
(Garrard  and  McNaughton.1998).  This  family  of  views,
which are often called motivational internalism, claims that
in order for a judgment to qualify as a moral judgment it
has to be motivational itself, or necessarily bring with it a
motivational state (like a desire). Internalist views come in
different  forms  and  can  range  from characterizations  of
moral judgments as expressions or pro or con attitudes to-
wards some object, all the way to rationalist positions that
claim that moral judgments include reasons and considera-
tions of reasons are in themselves motivational  states.  If
the task is to build an AI that makes moral judgments and
internalism is the option the engineer opts for, then the AI
would also have to be capable of being motivated by its
moral judgments—whatever form they take. 
The opposing view, externalism, holds that moral judg-
ments do not necessarily or inherently motivate,  nor can
they motivate by themselves (Brink 1986, 1989). On this
view,  moral  judgments  are  only  contingently  connected
with motivation. This allows a situation in which  a person
forms a moral judgment (usually as a belief) and lacks the
corresponding motivation to act on that judgment.  When
people are motivated to act morally, it is because they have
a moral belief that connects up in the relevant way to a de-
sire, for example, the desire to be a good person or the de-
sire to help a friend.
Realists and antirealists alike have to take sides on the
question  about  the  relationship  between  moral  judgment
and motivation. This task is challenging for many reasons,
not the least of which being that the very nature of motiva-
tion and the psychological state it is a proxy for is obscure.
An additional difficulty is that an adequate account of this
relationship has to contend with empirical data on the neu-
robiology of individuals with abnormal moral thinking or
behavior  (psychopaths,  people  affected  by brain  lesions,
autistic individuals, etc.). An adequate account must also
be  able  to  explain  the  wide  variability  in  the  extent  to
which people are motivated by their moral judgments and
the many ways  in which people fail  to be motivated by
their moral judgments. 
This brief review of some fairly coarse-grained metaeth-
ical distinctions suggests that the task of making an AI that
does ethics in the sense of being able to make moral judg-
ments, requires settling on many thorny metaethical ques-
tions about  moral  psychology and  metaphysics  of  moral
properties. 
Does this matter to the engineer?
The  metaphysics  of  moral  properties  and  the  nature  of
moral  judgments  and  in  general  what  it  means  to  “do
ethics” are subjects of philosophical dispute. This is why
the task of creating an AI that  does any of these things
seems  to  be  hostage  to  metaethics,  specifically  when  it
comes to questions about what moral judgments are, what
moral  properties are (and whether  they exist  at  all),  and
whether  motivation  plays  a  central  role  in  constituting
moral judgments. What may be particularly disheartening
about this situation is that there are currently no obvious
scientifically based paths forward in settling these issues.
But this does not mean that progress in this domain of
AI research should halt and patiently wait for the philoso-
phers to stop arguing. On the contrary, research in this area
could  lead  to  breakthroughs  that  may  help  the  philoso-
phers. Furthermore, the task of creating an artificial system
that does any of the things we discussed here is in itself in-
teresting  and  challenging.  So,  at  the  least,  the  engineer
could simply take from metaethics whatever may be useful
to that task and perhaps use it as a guide to their work.
Arguably, this situation is not very different from that
which exists with the research program into artificial con-
sciousness. Attempts to make an AI that has the capacity to
be conscious or self-aware are in their infancy  and there
exists significant disagreement in philosophy on the nature
of  consciousness.  Nonetheless,  research  in  neuroscience
and  psychology,  as  well  as  in  artificial  intelligence  that
concerns  consciousness,  does  not  halt  in  anticipation  of
philosophical consensus. On the contrary,  these disciples
now inform contemporary philosophical debates (Block et
al. 2014). The same pragmatic interdisciplinary approach
may be  useful  in  the  task  of  creating an  AI that  makes
moral judgments.
A possible strategy for continuing the project of creating
an AI that can make moral judgments would be to identify
the least demanding metaethical position and theory on the
role  that  motivation  plays  in  moral  judgments.  Philoso-
phers might find this strategy frustrating. This is because
metaethical positions that are easier to implement in an AI
will never make up for them getting it wrong about morali-
ty.1 In general, one may be skeptical about the project of
engineering an AI that, for all we know, may not be getting
it right regarding moral properties.  Nonetheless, we will
allow ourselves some speculation about what the relatively
easy to implement position may be. While a full defense of
the view we end up with is outside the scope of this paper,
some general remarks can already be made given what has
been said so far.
First of all, it seems that the engineering demands of a
fully realist project, which involves a moral microscope AI,
is  far  beyond what  we can presently achieve.  The more
plausible strategy involves simulating some aspect of our
moral psychology. Which one, of course, depends on other
considerations in metaethics.
Another difficult  engineering problem comes from the
discussion  of  the  relationship  between  moral  judgments
and action.  Take, for example,  internalism, according to
which there is a distinction to be made between agents who
make genuine moral judgments and agents who appear to
make moral judgments but do not because they lack any
motivation to act on those judgments. A telling example of
the  distinction  is  that  of  psychopaths  (or  “amoralists”).
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing our attention to this issue.
While  psychopaths  can  discriminate  between  right  and
wrong in a way that a normal person can, they lack any
corresponding motivation to act based on those discrimina-
tions. Psychopaths do not care about morality in the same
way that other people do (Roskies 2003). This is why the
moral claims made by psychopaths are often characterized
by internalists as moral judgments in only an inverted com-
ma sense (Hare 1952; Prinz 2007).
If the internalist is right, then the engineering project of
creating  an  AI  that  engages  in  moral  judgments  in  any
sense  involves  not  only the  challenge  of  replicating  the
ability or  capacity to discriminate right  from wrong,  but
also the arguably more difficult task of creating an internal
mental economy that involves motivation to act on those
discriminations. What compounds the already difficult situ-
ation in metaethics is the additional mystery of what moti-
vation could be for an AI. On its own, an AI lacks the ca-
pacity to act, even though it can behave.  These diffulties
make the task of an internalist engineer an order-of-magni-
tude more difficult than the task that faces an externalist.
An  externalist  denies  that  we  need  some  motivational
“oomph” to get genuine moral judgments. The externalist
thinks that psychopaths make moral judgments—they just
do not care about them in the same way that we do (Cima,
Tonnaer, and Hauser 2010). From an engineering perspec-
tive the externalist position is easier to implement.
On the distinction between cognitivism and non-cogni-
tivism the engineer should prefer the more elegant and less
demanding  cognitivism.  Cognitivism,  remember,  is  the
view that moral judgments are types of thoughts and be-
liefs. So their content is propositional, in the same way in
which the content of a thought or belief is. Propositional
content can be expressed by tokens of sentences or sym-
bols. Artificial intelligence techniques currently available,
such as programming languages PROLOG or LISP, or cog-
nitive architectures  SOAR or ACT-R,  largely depend on
processing symbols and sentence tokens.
Non-cognitivism, on the other hand, presents the extra
difficulty of simulating conative states, such as emotions or
desires. While some of these states clearly have an aspect
that involves contents other aspects of these states are qual-
itative. It is difficult to say what it would take to put quali-
tative character of fear or happiness into an AI.
We discussed three metaethical dimensions along which
there is significant disagreement and made the further ob-
servation that depending on the assumptions and choices
made in each of these dimensions we end up with distinct
engineering challenges. These dimensions are: realism/an-
tirealism, cognitivism/non-cognitivism, and externalism/in-
ternalism. The least demanding combination of views for
the least demanding project of creating an AI that makes
moral judgments is one that embraces antirealism, cogni-
tivism,  and  externalism about  moral  motivation.  Such  a
system  issues  moral  judgments,  which  have  a  structure
akin  to  sentences  (cognitivism).  This  is  irrespective  of
whether or not tokens of these sentences are hooking up
with an external moral reality and whether such a reality
even exists (antirealism). Because of the extraordinary de-
mands of internalism, these moral judgments will also not
be inherently motivating or hook up with action in a robust
way (externalism).
Although it is not obvious what to conclude from this, it
is a somewhat surprising combination of positions that is
relatively rare in the metaethical literature. Error theory po-
tentially comes close to be consistent with all of these posi-
tions, yet some of the classic statements of error theory in-
clude an element of internalism (Mackie 1977). A specific
version of error theory, fictionalism, may come closest to
fitting the description of the kind of minimal assumptions
to be built  into the AI (Joyce 2007).  Fictionalism is  the
view that although we are systematically mistaken in the
way we form moral judgments and use moral language, we
should go on doing so for various practical reasons. This is
what we should expect the first AI that “does ethics” to do
as well.
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